Multiple Signature Algorithms and the Bridge CA Concept

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Current Federal Situation

Numerous Federal PKI pilots

- built and paid for for some agency application
 - justified in terms of benefit to that application

Different Architectures

mesh (Entrust), browser (DoD, ACES, etc.),&Hierarchical (MISSI-DMS)

Different Algorithms

– DSA, RSA and, soon, EC-DSA

Current Situation

Little interoperability between pilots


- At present interoperability is a hard problem at the practical level
- Has been more difficult than you would think even to achieve cert. path interoperation between CAs from the same vendor.
- Multiple algorithms make the problem worse

Certificate and Signed Document

Certificate **Signed Document** version (v3) serial number signature issuer name validity period subject name subject public key info algorithm identifier subject public key issuer unique identifier subject unique identifier **SIGNED** extensions algorithm identifier ENCRYPTED HASH **SIGNED** algorithmidentifier **ENCRYPTED HASH**

Certification Path

 Alice verifies Bob's certificate by verifying a certification path ending in one issued by a CA she trusts



Certification Path Interoperability

- Primary interoperability issue is can Alice find and process a certification path to Bob, when they have different CAs?
- Many other CA to CA crosscertification, CA to repository, repository to repository, CA to RA interoperability issues

Digital Signature Algorithms

- Several digital signature algorithms in use
 - RSA
 - DSA
 - parameters
 - ECDSA
 - parameters

Parameters

Publicly known constants

- usually the same for all certs. issued by a CA
- can be big numbers
 - same general size as public key
- Specified in subjectPublicKeyInfo field of certificate

Parameter Inheritance

- Makes certificates smaller
- If parameters aren't specified in publicKeyInfo field, they are "inherited" from previous step in certification path

Parameter Inheritance

Not specified in X.509

- incorporated in PKIX
- done in MISSI
 - only "root" and high level ("PAA") CAs normally include parameters in their certificates; subordinate CAs and end-entity certificates inherit their parameters

Definitions

Consistent certificate

- subject and signer algorithms are the same
- parameters can be inherited

Hybrid certificate

- subject key and signer algorithms are different
- allowed by X.509
- subject parameters must be specified
- relying party must validate 2 algorithms

Hybrid Certificates

- Must have one in path if Bob and Alice use different algorithm
- Otherwise are undesirable
 - need to implement 2 algorithms to use them
 - may be large, because of parameters

Goals:

- never have more than one hybrid in cert. path
 - never introduce 3rd algorithm in path

Interoperability Approaches

Parallel PKIs

- separate PKI for each algorithm
 - expensive
 - no hybrid certificates
- user has certificates (and perhaps clients) for each algorithm needed for interoperability
 - how many certificates does he need?
 - how many can he manage?
 - simpler (but perhaps more) clients

Interoperability Approaches

End-Entity

- clients may sign with only one algorithm, but are expected to validate all algorithms
 - user needs only one certificate
 - some extra expense in clients
 - inconsistent certificates are needed for interoperability

Hybrid Certificates

Hybrid end-entity certificates usually make little sense

- every relying party must be able to validate both algorithms
- even certificate holders of the same CAs must validate 2 algorithms to interoperate
- requires parameters be specified in end-entity certificates

General Approach

- End-entity solution is best
- Use consistent end-entity certificates
- Consistent trust domains desirable
 - minimize interop problems in domain
- One signature algorithm per CA
 - a CA is just a name in this context
 - create a new name for each algorithm
 - avoids mixed algorithm Certificate Revocation Lists

Parameters

Specify parameters only

- in self-signed certificates
- in hybrid certificates
- when the parameters for the subject key are different than the signing key

Bridge CA Approach

- Build nexus to connect the pieces
- Three key elements:
 - Federal Policy Management Authority (PMA)
 - Federal "Bridge" CA (BCA)
 - not a root
 - cross certifies with CAs
 - Bridge CA Repository
 - for CA certificates and status

Federal PMA

- Overall management of FPKI
- Supervises BCA and BCA Repository
- Sets overall Federal Cert. Policies
 - assurance levels
 - model policies
- Approves Bridge CA crosscertification
 - reviews CA CPS

Trust Domain

A group of CAs that

- operate under the supervision of a Domain
 Policy Management Authority
- use consistent policies, and have similar
 Certification Practice Statements (CPS)

Bridge CA (BCA)

Cross certifies with "Principal CA (PCA)" in each trust domain

- not a root: does not start cert paths
- may have constraints in the certs it issues
- also cross certifies with non-Federal PCAs

Issues Authority CRL (ARL)

- CRL for all Federal CAs (and perhaps others)
- Modest size, since CA certs. are not volatile

Bridge CA Repository

One-stop shopping for CA certs.

- CA certs. for the Federal PKI
- ARL

High availability

key to building cert. paths


Medium bandwidth

- everything it holds can be cached
- ARL should not be large

Principal CA

- Designated CA in each trust domain
- Has cert. path to all other CAs in the domain
- In hierarchical domain, the root CA

Bridge CA FPKI Architecture




Possible BCA Approaches

- Preferred algorithm
- Multiple algorithm bridge
- Split bridge


Preferred Algorithm Approach

- Bridge signs with one algorithm
 - everybody who usesBCA must validate this algorithm
- Efficient
- Can we pick one algorithm and make it stick?



Multiple Algorithm BCA


- BCA signs with several algorithms
 - issues all hybrid certificates to PCAs
- BCA issues several ARLs
 - one per algorithm
- To make cert. path, how do we easily identify needed PCA certificates?
 - several for each PCA



Split Bridge CA

Separate Bridge CA per algorithm

 each BCA has a separate name, by not necessarily a separate physical workstation



Split Bridge CA

- All hybrid certs occur between BCAs
- Fewer additional hybrid certs than Multiple Algorithm Bridge
- Separate BCA names may simplify finding the right hybrid cert or ARL
- Hybrid cert becomes an extra step in cert paths

Conclusion

- Bridge is the right point to provide hybrid certs to address multialgorithm interoperability
- Question: which BCA oriented approach do we prefer?